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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890008-CA
Priority No. 2

JEROME WALLACE SMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Issues, Jurisdictional Statement,
Statement of the Case, and Statement of the Facts are set forth in
Appellant's opening brief at pages iv thru 7.

Appellant takes this

opportunity to respond to the arguments set forth in Points IA and B
of Respondent's brief.

The remaining arguments are adequately

covered in Appellant's opening brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A careful reading of the facts in this case establishes
that the officer seized Appellant's automobile.

The officer

characterized his actions as "stopping" the vehicle, and, regardless
of whether he used his overhead lights or a spotlight to effectuate
the stop, a seizure occurred when Appellant's ability to drive away
was blocked by the police vehicle.
The officer did not articulate a reasonable basis for
stopping the Appellant.

The behavior of the person leaning inside

the window who then walked away is similar to the nervous behavior
in Mendoza and Schlosser and should not be given weight.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MR, SMITH AND THE
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
A.

OFFICER SMITH "SEIZED" APPELLANT.

In arguing that no seizure occurred in this case, the
State ignores the clear testimony of Officer Smith.
OFFICER:
signal.

That was the reason I stopped him was no

DEFENSE COUNSEL:
right-hand turn?
OFFICER:

Did you cite him for the

Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: When you stopped him, you parked
right behind him. Is that correct?
OFFICER:

As indicated, yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And his vehicle could not have
moved one way or the other; is that correct?
OFFICER: I don't believe he could have backed out
of there without either striking my vehicle or
getting close to it.
T. 14. Unlike the facts in Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965
(Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987), the
Appellant's path was blocked by the police officer and he was
therefore not free to leave in the instant case.1

Regardless of

1 In Layton City, the officer followed defendant into a
construction site; there is no indication that the officer blocked
the driver's ability to leave as in the case currently before the
Court. In a Memorandum Decision, this Court held that no stop
occurred under the circumstances in Layton City.

whether the officer used his overhead lights or his spotlight to
effectuate the stop, a stop occurred when the officer blocked
Mr. Smith's ability to drive away.
Various courts have found that a seizure occurred under
the fourth amendment where an officer blocked a defendant's ability
to drive away.

In People v. Guy, 329 N.W.2d 435 (Mich. App. 1983),

an officer drove by a parked car.

The car then pulled out from the

curb and drove into a driveway of a house.

The officer returned and

parked his police car so as to partially block the driveway, then
approached the car.

Under such circumstances, the court held that

the officer's actions "clearly constituted a detention."

j[d. at 440.

In United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1987),
an officer pulled into a driveway as the defendant was backing out,
blocking defendant's path.

The defendant stopped, got out of his

car and gave the officer identification without being asked.

The

Ninth Circuit overruled the trial court's decision that a seizure
had not occurred2, stating in part:
Under the circumstances, Deputy Hedrick's
authority and conduct provided Kerr no alternative
except an encounter with the police.
Id. at 1387. The Court also noted that the defendant's perception
of his inability to leave as evidenced by his disclosure that he had
no driver's license, an admission against his interest, should be
considered in determining that a seizure occurred.

2

See also United

The Kerr Court noted that "[w]e review de novo the
district court's decision that no fourth amendment seizure
occurred." Kerr, 817 F.2d at 1386.
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States v, Zukas, 843 P.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1988) (parking car in front
of airplane so as to block access to runway, then approaching pilot
and asking for identification and registration is a seizure).
In this case, where the officer blocked the defendant's
ability to drive away (T. 9, 14), then approached the defendant's
vehicle and asked for identification, a reasonable person in
Mr. Smith's position would have believed he was not free to leave.
Running the warrants check is further indication that a seizure
occurred.

See United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973)

(officer seized defendant when officer asked defendant to come to
police car so he could run warrants check); State v. Johnson, 771
P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989) (cert, granted June 12, 1989) (defendant
seized when officer took defendant's name and birthdate "and
expected her to wait while he ran warrants check").
Although the State claims that "Officer Smith did not do
anything that caused Defendant to take this action [stop his vehicle
in the parking lot] and did not use his overhead lights"
(Respondent's brief at 8), such a statement ignores Officer Smith's
statements that he stopped the vehicle (T. 14, 52-53, 15, 41-2) as
well as the officer's uncertainty as to whether he used his overhead
lights or his spotlight to effectuate the stop.
OFFICER: I don't remember whether I turned on my
overheads, or used my spotlight.
PROSECUTOR: And what point would you have done
that? At what point in space here?
OFFICER: When I'm approaching to stop any
vehicle, use the radio to call out, work the
lights and/or the hand-held spotlight.

- 4 -

T. 41-2. The State's position that Officer Smith did nothing to
effectuate the stop also ignores the officer's statements regarding
the grounds for the stop.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: When you got out of the vehicle,
and Mr. Smith got out of the vehicle, did you tell
him why you were stopping him?
OFFICER: I did tell him during our conversation
that he didn't signal.
T. 52.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You testified that you pulled
him over, and stopped him for the turn signal; is
that correct for the failure to turn?
OFFICER:

Yes.

That's common terminology.

T. 53.
B. OFFICER SMITH DID NOT ARTICULATE A REASONABLE
BASIS FOR STOPPING APPELLANT.
The State points out that "the common thread" in cases
where the Utah Supreme Court has found that the officer lacked a
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain an individual "is an
officer stopping an individual on the luck-of-the-draw that
something could be wrong."

Respondent's brief at 14. This is

precisely such a case; the officer had a hunch and hoped to be lucky
enough to find something criminal to pursue when he stopped
Appellant.
Although a police officer is entitled to rely on his
experience (see Respondent's brief at 13), he must nevertheless
articulate specific facts which, when viewed in light of the
officer's experience, give rise to a basis for the stop.
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A stop

cannot be justified solely on an officer's statement that because he
is a police officer, he knew something was amiss.

In the instant

case, Officer Smith could not articulate actions or facts which gave
rise to a suspicion as the result of his experience.
The State's reliance on the officer's observation of an
individual leaning into the Defendant's car (Respondent's brief at
15) as offering a basis for the stop is misplaced.

First, although

Officer Smith assumed the person leaning inside the car left because
the officer approached (T. 39), the officer did not testify that the
person looked up or looked at him.

Instead, the person simply

walked away from the car (T. 39). There are a number of reasonable
explanations, totally unrelated to the officer's arrival, for
walking away from the car.
In addition, the behavior of the individual in walking
away from the car, even in light of the officer's experience, has an
endless number of reasonable and legal explanations.

On September

nights throughout Salt Lake City, individuals lean inside car
windows to chat with neighbors, say goodbye to friends, hand the
checkbook to a husband going to the store.

Nothing about this

behavior makes it suspect.
In State v. Mendoza, 738 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987), the
Utah Supreme Court refused to give weight to the "nervous behavior"
of a car's occupants in determining whether officers had a
reasonable suspicion to justify a detention.

And, in State v.

Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (May 17, 1989), the Utah Supreme
Court again refused to give weight to the nervous behavior of an
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individual, pointing out that:
when confronted with a traffic stop, it is not
uncommon for drivers and passengers alike to be
nervous and excited . . .
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. The Court concluded that:
[a] search based on such common gestures and
movements is a mere "hunch," not an articulable
suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment.
JEd.
Although it is not clear in this case that the person who
walked away did so because the officer approached, even if that were
the case, nervousness around officers does not give rise to a
reasonable articulable suspicion so as to justify a stop.
Furthermore, the fourth amendment protects citizens against
unreasonable detentions and, even under State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d
616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), and United States v. Merritt, 732 F.2d
223 (5th Cir. 1984), a citizen is free to walk away from an officer
where the officer does not have a reasonable articulable suspicion
to justify a detention.

Exercising fourth amendment rights by

walking away from an officer where the officer has no basis for
detaining that person does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion
under the fourth amendment that criminal activity is afoot.
The State did not sustain its burden of establishing that
the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion so as to justify
the stop.
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CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Smith
respectfully requests this Court reverse his conviction and remand
the case to the trial court with an order of dismissal or
suppression of the illegally seized evidence, or, in the
alternative, remand the case for rehearing on the motion to suppress.
Submitted this

1~7

day of July, 1989.

FRANCES M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

^<M;JOAN C .

C cikQf
WATT

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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